➵ Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy) Read ➼ Author Jaegwon Kim – Ivogue.co.uk



10 thoughts on “Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy)

  1. says:

    Sort of dry at times, but very thorough regardless of its overall brevity I think Kim makes a convincing case for the overall aims of physicalism throughout the book but his conclusion or something near enough really isn t much different from that of anti reductionists like Chalmers, though he reaches it in about a 1 3 of the pages of Chalmers book The Conscious Mind He provides a solid refutation of substance dualism but this was something I d already seen done many times before, so it felt a little like watching a cool but familiar parlor trick rather than riding along on an exciting philosophical journey He also has an very c...


  2. says:

    Kim is an elegant writer who can deftly stake out deep and complicated metaphysical positions without becoming inaccessible to the reader The thrust of the book is essentially this we can make sense of reducing the mental ...


  3. says:

    The position is, as we might say, a slightly defective physicalism physicalism manque but not by much I believe that this is as much physicalism as we can have, and that there is no credible alternative to physicalism as a general worldview Physicalism is not the whole truth, but it is the truth near enough, and near enough should be good enough Jaegwon Kim s account of a functionally reducing physicalist approach to the philosophy of mind is, for the most part, clear, thoughtful, and relatively accessible, but it faces two problems.First, his treatment of substance dualism is simplistic, shallow, and disingenuous He mischaracterizes the dualist view, and his argument essentially boils down to, I have a hard time picturing how this would work, so let s just agree that it doesn t Not only is this rather sloppy, it contradicts one of Kim s own assertions He acknowledges that his own system leaves many questions unanswered see the quote above , and he says that insoluble problems by themselves are not sufficient reason to reject a system Yet he rejects dualism precisely because he thinks it leaves insoluble problems So which is it For what it s worth, I don t think dualism s problems are nearly as insurmountable as he...


  4. says:

    Chapter 3 The Rejection of Immaterial Minds A Causal Argument of this book was a reading suggested in A Dialog on Consciousness by Torin Alter and Robert J Howell I only read chapter 3 and found it to be a good explanation of the causation problem for nonphysical souls.


  5. says:

    for reference


  6. says:

    I am not a philosopher, but with some help and clarifications from Kim s basic book Philosophy of Mind I was able to follow the discussion and understand the arguments.Kim has an impressive ability to be very clear, methodical and precise when analyzing the work of other philosophers or presenting his own arguments It is a refreshing change and very welcome, especially after reading too many vague and messy books and articles This book s deceptive appearance of simplicity is a good indication of Kim s clarity of thought, deep understanding and probably years of distilling ideas to their current form It is what metaphysics should be and what science desperately needs.Personally, I ve been interested mostly in Kim s discussion of reduction identity and functional , but I am sure that I ll get back for details on menta...


  7. says:

    Kim is always a great writer The or something near enough in the title is due to Kim s conclusion that phenomenal states qualia are irreducible, epiphenomenal states, which form the mental residue of the universe Now, how in the world you get phenomenal consciousness from arranging bits of matter throughout the course of evolution remains a mystery for the phy...


  8. says:

    Having been a student of consciousness and the philosophy of mind, Jaegwon s book on physicalism has really opened up my mind in terms of the physicalist view of consciousness Jaegwon is quite good at giving the reader a concise history of the views of the philosophy of mind in my opinion , but I should note, you SHOULD be really somewhat familiar with the philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.Not to spoil Jaegwon s point o...


  9. says:

    This book is great, and quite funny A good insight about the content could be the explanation of Ontology of the world the content of the world is wholly exhausted by matter Material things are all the things that there are there is nothing inside the spacetime world that isn t material, and of course there is nothing outside it either The spacetime world is the whole world, and material things, bits of matter and complex structures made up of bits of matter, are its only inhabitants Ju...


  10. says:

    This is a topic I m interested in, and this book was recommended by some philosophy prof grad student I discovered on YouTube, as a good place to startwill report back laterMerry Christmas to me I ve put this one on hold, as the Int...


Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy) Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough Princeton Monographs In Philosophy Read Author Jaegwon Kim Ivogue.co.uk Contemporary Discussions In Philosophy Of Mind Have Largely Been Shaped By Physicalism, The Doctrine That All Phenomena Are Ultimately Physical Here, Jaegwon Kim Presents The Most Comprehensive And Systematic Presentation Yet Of His Influential Ideas On The Mind Body Problem He Seeks To Determine, After Half A Century Of Debate What Kind Of Or How Much Physicalism Can We Lay Claim To He Begins By Laying Out Mental Causation And Consciousness As The Two Principal Challenges To Contemporary Physicalism How Can Minds Exercise Their Causal Powers In A Physical World Is A Physicalist Account Of Consciousness Possible The Book S Starting Point Is The Supervenience Argument Sometimes Called The Exclusion Argument , Which Kim Reformulates In An Extended Defense This Argument Shows That The Contemporary Physicalist Faces A Stark Choice Between Reductionism The Idea That Mental Phenomena Are Physically Reducible And Epiphenomenalism The View That Mental Phenomena Are Causally Impotent Along The Way, Kim Presents A Novel Argument Showing That Cartesian Substance Dualism Offers No Help With Mental Causation Mind Body Reduction, Therefore, Is Required To Save Mental Causation But Are Minds Physically Reducible Kim Argues That All But One Type Of Mental Phenomena Are Reducible, Including Intentional Mental Phenomena, Such As Beliefs And Desires The Apparent Exceptions Are The Intrinsic, Felt Qualities Of Conscious Experiences Qualia Kim Argues, However, That Certain Relational Properties Of Qualia, In Particular Their Similarities And Differences, Are Behaviorally Manifest And Hence In Principle Reducible, And That It Is These Relational Properties Of Qualia That Are Central To Their Cognitive Roles The Causal Efficacy Of Qualia, Therefore, Is Not Entirely Lost According To Kim, Then, While Physicalism Is Not The Whole Truth, It Is The Truth Near Enough.